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Abstract: In the absence of accounting rules, financial reports and 
disclosures were of little use to shareholders and stakeholders before 
World War I. To offset the unreliability of financial information, sev-
eral banks, including the Crédit Lyonnais, implemented a system of 
accounting analysis that, in essence, anticipated modern financial-
analysis tools based on funds statements and cash-flow statements. 
This paper, based on the Crédit Lyonnais archives, sets out to explain 
the purpose of this method, to present the different concepts em-
ployed, and to show how they interact. The relevance of this model is  
assessed through two case studies.
INTRODUCTION
After the failure in France of a number of Saint-Simonist1 
initiatives, such as Laffitte’s Caisse Générale du Commerce et de 
l’Industrie in 1837 and the Pereire brothers’ Crédit Mobilier from 
1852 onwards, mixed banks (banks combining both commercial 
and investment-banking activities) emerged at the same time as 
large department stores. They would be called “savings banks” 
before World War I, having been labeled on occasion with the 
rather pejorative term of “financial bazaars” [Bigo, 1947, p. 182]. 
1 The French social philosopher and reformer Claude Henri de Rouvroy, 
Comte de Saint-Simon (1760-1825), was one of the founders of modern industrial 
socialism and evolutionary sociology. Indeed, Auguste Comte, who is widely seen 
as the father of sociology, was one of his secretaries. Saint-Simon denounced the 
privileges of noble birth and saw the nobility essentially as “men of leisure” (oisifs), 
idle hornets (frelons) who exploit a mass of “workers” (the bees). He argued for 
the idea of creating a new society, one that relied notably on re-organizing the 
economy and credit and one in which industrialists, thinkers, and artists were to 
lead the nation. His arguments won over a significant vocal fringe of engineers, 
mostly graduates from the École Polytechnique, persuaded by his ideas of renewal 
of the governing elite.
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Notably during the Second Empire but also up to the inter-war 
period, they were the main players involved in structuring the 
credit system in France.
The Crédit Lyonnais (CL) was the epitome of a success that 
was if not collective at least pluralistic since other so-called sav-
ings banks such as the Comptoir d’Escompte (1848), Crédit In-
dustriel et Commercial (1859), the Société des Dépôts et Comptes 
Courants (1863), the Société Lyonnaise de Dépôts (1863), the So-
ciété Générale (1863), and the Société Marseillaise de Crédit (1865) 
can also be added to the list. The CL’s early move away from 
direct investment in industry forced it to become the savings 
bank par excellence, and its subsequent history demonstrates the 
significance of this decision. From this constraint, it was able 
to draw its strength – the small unitary margins generated by 
commercial banking operations required the bank to implement 
a high-performance organizational structure in which informa-
tion had to be centralized to enlighten rational decision making 
and to limit risk. For such everyday banking business, Henri 
Germain, the founder and chairman of the CL until the turn of 
the 20th century, would put accounting at the heart of his infor-
mation system.
The CL’s withdrawal from the sector of direct investment 
went together with the birth of its Service des Études Financières 
(SEF) (the Department of Financial Analysis). On the issue of 
financial brokering, in which the CL played a leading role, as-
sessing the risk of insolvency2 did not yet rely on quantitative 
and statistical analysis methods such as “credit rating,” but in-
stead on financial and accounting analysis tools. In this context, 
the SEF’s main purpose was to draft technical and/or financial 
studies for numerous departments requesting them, such as 
Securities Management, Risks, Interbank Relations, Securities 
Issuance, to enable them to use sector-specific information and 
accounting data provided by companies to measure company 
economic viability and to assess the risks the bank was assum-
ing. The SEF also carried out economic monitoring, including 
macroeconomic studies, sector-specific studies, and data col-
lection. Since it reported directly to general management, its 
strategic function would always ensure it remained independent 
from other departments.
2 For more in-depth study of the issue of risk assessment at the CL, see Praquin 
[2003, 2005]. It should be noted that this paper does not consider the use of ac-
counting techniques for the management of CL itself. For a recent study of this, 
see Pezet and Sponem [2008].
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More specifically, this service set up a system of “decon-
structing” accounts disclosed by companies with the purpose of 
restating them. This analysis of financial statements constituted 
one of the major reasons for this service to exist; the goal was to 
reduce the risk of asymmetrical information tied to the window-
dressing that most companies engaged in at that time in western 
countries such as Britain [Edwards, 1980], France [Lemarch-
and, 1992], Germany [Spoerer, 1998], Spain [Bernal Lloréns, 
2000], and the U.S. [Dicksee, 1927; Michael, 1996]. This tool 
for analyzing annual statements relied on an intricate system of 
tables designed to establish concordance between the earnings 
disclosed by companies and the cash flows they generated. This 
cohesive set of tools predated the methods of corporate financial 
analysis that were to be implemented in France from the end of 
the 1950s onwards. 
This paper therefore pursues two aims. The first is to show, 
both in general terms and through two case studies, how a prof-
itable financial institution came to implement risk-assessment 
tools. The second is to highlight the fact that historical research 
enables us to understand how some accounting and financial 
concepts, however much they may be perceived today as in-
novative, were actually envisioned in bygone eras before being 
forgotten due to the lack of appropriate diffusion.
HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE CL
The history of the birth and development of the CL is inex-
tricably tied to the personality of its founder, Henri Germain,3 
who was to leave his mark on the bank until retiring from busi-
ness life. The first 20 years were marked by an uncertainty that 
weighed heavily on the strategic direction given to the CL. After 
an unfruitful period of direct investment in companies, Germain 
took the decision to orientate the bank definitively towards 
short-cycle activities.
1863-1882: An Uncertain Strategy for Assets: The composition of 
the first Board of Directors was significant in terms of both the 
3 Born in 1824, Germain studied law. In 1856, he took on a position as a bro-
ker and perfected his knowledge of the business world by working in a Lyon silk-
making business owned by the Saint-Simonist Arlès-Dufour. His second marriage 
was to a Vuitry, the daughter of the former governor of the Banque de France, 
former minister, and president of the State Council. At 40, he founded the CL. 
Elected as a député on several occasions from 1869 onwards, he was prevented 
three times from becoming a minister by James de Rothschild’s veto. He died in 
1905.
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multiple influences they exerted on the CL at the outset and the 
ambiguity of the strategy with which Germain wished to endow 
it. Among the board members were Saint-Simonists, arguing 
for a new social order to be built on industrial development and 
wealth sharing, who rubbed shoulders with more conservative 
bankers and industrialists. What they had in common was that 
they all belonged to a business class faced with a banking sys-
tem that they judged to be archaic and unable to satisfy their 
financing needs. Local bankers offered insufficient financial 
soundness, and the Banque de France declined to part from its 
traditional role as discount broker and would only underwrite 
certain securities – government securities, shares, and French 
railway bonds. Some hoped to obtain easier cash loans while 
others sought to find ways of underwriting and circulating the 
bond loans they issued. 
From this plethora of expectations was born a mixed 
bank, similar to the main competitors previously mentioned. 
 Germain’s convictions differed according to whether his 
focus was on assets or liabilities. On the liability side, from 
its creation onwards, the focus of the CL was invariably to try 
to attract small investors by offering good rates of interest as 
the bank sought popularity as a savings bank. In addition, it 
proposed demand deposits, fixed-term deposits, commercial 
paper, and interest accounts reserved for banking and business 
clients. Germain proved to be still more inconsistent with regard 
to assets. The CL began by becoming involved in industrial 
investments in the hope of making quick capital gains. This 
reflected a rationale typical of economic development in the 
Second Empire when large investments made large profits. The 
risk tied to the amount of capital invested was associated with 
the possibility of a yield significantly higher than in current 
banking operations. However, Germain did not wish to relive the 
disastrous experience of the Pereire brothers’ Crédit Mobilier.4 
He remained prudent and dedicated the majority of assets to 
discount operations which were less fruitful but much safer 
owing to the spreading of risk and the short-cycle nature of this 
activity.
4 These brothers founded the first French conglomerate. Also Saint-Simonists, 
they had built their businesses (rail and maritime transport, property, banking, 
and insurance) by relying on a bank, the Crédit Mobilier, that was in charge of is-
suing and circulating the bonds necessary for financing these investments. Falling 
out of favor, and unfortunate in a number of property deals, they lost the support 
of the political powers and went bankrupt. 
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From 1870 onwards, Germain’s turning away from all di-
rect industrial investment forced him to invent another form 
of banking and to create a model that stood for the soundness 
and liquidity of its investments. This shift from a mixed bank to 
what would later be called a savings bank was completed in the 
aftermath of the stock market crash of 1882.
1882-1914: Success in Choosing a Banking Specialization: The 
progressive disengagement from the industrial sector was a suc-
cess for the CL. From the end of the 1870s, it became “the lead-
ing French publicly-traded bank” [Bouvier, 1961, p. 68] until the 
end of World War I. While its competitors were still embroiled 
in industrial “adventures,” such as the Société Générale with its 
sulphur, guano, and loans businesses in Sicily and in Peru, or 
the Comptoir d’Escompte de Paris’ backing of speculation in cop-
per, Germain’s bank took advantage of this period of slower eco-
nomic growth to strengthen its network in France and abroad. 
From 110 branches and offices in 1882, it expanded to 257 by 
1903. From 1884 onwards, it offered new services to its clientele, 
such as rental of safe boxes, and by the turn of the century, it 
had also launched a significant property-building program in 
Lyon and Paris.
In other words, the choice of specializing in current op-
erations proved to be profitable in the long term. This special-
ization occurred mainly through the management of accounts, 
short-term operations (loans, overdrafts, seasonal loans), and 
banking intermediation (selling shares and bond issues to its 
clients). However, such an orientation could only be successful 
at the price of constant vigilance, which specifically meant find-
ing an accounting tool that performed ever better and setting up 
specialized services such as the Service des Etudes Financières 
(SEF). The latter was responsible for studying the quality of re-
quests for banking intermediation that various companies made 
to the CL. In order to assess better these proposals, it imple-
mented a system of financial analysis, the history of which is 
outlined below. The CL’s strategy proved to be effective especially 
when compared to other banks. Its profit margins and dividend 
payouts were significantly higher that those of its competitors 
(Figure 1).
The CL’s growth ensured regular increases in its profits 
which rose at the same pace as figures in the main entries of its 
balance sheet (Figure 2). A comparison of progress in the main 
liabilities (current accounts in credit, demand deposits) and in 
assets (commercial portfolios, current accounts in debit) with 
5
Praquin: Credit Lyonnais in France (c. 1871-1918): Using cash flow analysis to assess risk in banking;
Published by eGrove, 2010
Accounting Historians Journal, June 20106
the rise in profits, whether disclosed or “original,”5 is fairly tell-
ing. The first observation is logical – the progression of assets 
is in line with liabilities. The second observation proves to be 
much more interesting in that following the crash of the Union 
Générale in 1882,6 profits experienced regular growth, strongly 
correlating to that of the main entries in the balance sheet. 
In other words, the decision to increase its geographic 
scope in France and abroad enabled the CL to stimulate not 
5 The “original” profits are provided by Bouvier et al. [1965, p. 239]. They are 
defined in the following way: “the mass of profits is understood over each finan-
cial year as an ‘original’ mass including: profits paid out (dividends, directors’ 
fees), profits in reserve, diverse provisions and amortizations on dubious debtors, 
insofar as these last two entries are signalled” (p. 219). We can see that in the 
framework of a semi-logarithmic graph, “instruments par excellence for compar-
ing rhythms of variation” [Saly, 1997, p. 107], they present hardly any difference 
with disclosed profits. Yet, it seemed interesting to show them insofar as they 
could have provided additional insight given the considerable arithmetic variance 
that exists with the disclosed net incomes.
6 The Union Générale was established in 1878 to compete specifically with the 
CL and, more generally, “Jewish” finance. It aimed to attract mainly “Catholic” 
savings and succeeded in obtaining the support of the French clergy. It experi-
enced rapid growth, often criticized by its detractors. Numerous abuses and ac-
counting manipulations brought it to bankruptcy in 1882. This bankruptcy trig-
gered the first French stock-market crisis and brought about a series of economic 
and social troubles. 
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only the flow of savings but also the flow of net incomes. The 
quasi- indexation of low unitary profits on the growing mass of 
resources (i.e., liabilities) mechanically generated an equally 
increased accounting net income.
THE WORK OF THE SEF
In September 1871, Germain came up with the idea of an 
office, unique in its way and never equaled [Kaufmann, 1914, p. 
353]: 
The Comptoir National also set up, a few years ago, a 
financial analysis department. The Crédit Lyonnais’ 
department was used as a model. However, with only 
 limited staff, it cannot be compared, even remotely, 
with its much larger rival. A body with this centralizing 
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The Case of the Crédit Lyonnais: Trends in the 
Main Entries in the Balance Sheet Compared
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Sources: All the entries except that of the “original” profits come from graphs 
published by the CL on the occasion of its fiftieth anniversary [Brochure du 
cinquantenaire du Crédit Lyonnais: 1863-1913, archive hc14]. The “original” 
profits are provided by the work of Bouvier et al. [1965, p. 239]. They are defined 
in the following way: “The mass of profits is understood over each financial year 
as an ‘original’ mass including: profits paid out (dividends, directors’ fees), profits 
in reserve, diverse provisions, and amortizations on dubious debtors, insofar as 
these last two entries are signalled” [Bouvier et al., 1965, p. 219]. We can see that 
in the framework of a semi-logarithmic graph, “instruments par excellence for 
comparing rhythms of variation” [Saly, 1997, p. 107], they hardly present any 
difference with disclosed profits. Yet, it seemed interesting to us to show them 
insofar as they could have provided additional insight given the considerable 
arithmetic variance that exists with the disclosed net incomes.
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feature does not exist at the Société Générale. It leaves 
each department to decide what information to acquire 
and the data that it needs.
Even though the issue of assessing risk was a concern wide-
ly shared by the whole banking sector at that time [Bonin, 2000], 
what is striking here is the importance of the role played by the 
SEF in the development of the CL [Bigo, 1948; Bouvier, 1961].
The SEF was an independent and autonomous service. De-
pending on the case, its studies were released in single unified 
documents that either explicitly or implicitly discriminated be-
tween the technical and the financial parts. One of the greatest 
challenges the SEF encountered was managing to break away 
from the window-dressing carried out by companies that dis-
closed their accounts to the CL.
Role and Purpose of the SEF: This service was responsible for 
collecting and analyzing economic and financial intelligence. In 
the public arena, the context was favorable since financial data 
and economic statistics7 were developing and communication 
infrastructures (the telegraph and the railway) could enable 
their rapid circulation. It was the moment for the CL to create 
added value by developing its know-how in centralizing, sort-
ing, and organizing disparate data sets in order to draw quality 
information from them and to be the first to act on “big business 
opportunities” and to generate thereby “huge profits” [Meeting 
of the Board of Directors, November 5, 1889, cited by Flandreau, 
2003, p. 259; see also Bouvier, 1961, p. 290]. Also, it would later 
enable the bank to target investments for its large clientele using 
first-hand intelligence, as stated in the Brochure du cinquante-
naire du Crédit Lyonnais (1863-1913): “The SEF is working for 
both our clientele and for all of the services and branches of the 
Crédit Lyonnais” [CL Archives, hcl4, p. 48].
The SEF periodically carried out in-depth studies that it 
sometimes supplemented with reports drafted on more specific 
points. These studies had several purposes. They gave the CL 
7 In addition to the numerous newspapers born with the Second Empire and 
affiliated to powerful moneymen (Mirès’ Le journal des chemins de fer, the Pereire 
brothers’ Le journal des actionnaires, La semaine financière, which was indirectly 
tied to the Rothschilds), a more independent press also developed, such as the 
Messager de la Bourse, the Journal des économistes, or, much later in 1873, Leroy-
Beaulieu’s L’économiste français. From the mid-19th century onwards, economic 
statistics developed in the form of congresses (Berlin in 1863, Budapest in 1878, 
etc.) or studies, with the notable backing of Napoléon III.
8
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a chance to reduce its risks by knowing the financial quality of 
both current and prospective clients in greater depth. They also 
gave it an opportunity to improve the management of its clien-
tele’s credit lines by increasing, maintaining, or reducing the 
outstanding payments yet to be made. But, most importantly, in 
the framework of the CL’s intermediation activities, these studies 
enabled the bank to guarantee high-quality securities to its clien-
tele of savers and investors. Specifically because of this financial 
analysis service, the CL was widely recognized as a bank of the 
highest order and soon won the trust of its peers. It often led 
banking syndicates and found no difficulty gathering financial 
partners around the table to float companies on the stock mar-
ket and sell shares to the public. Companies also benefited from 
these studies because obtaining intermediation from the CL was 
for them an additional guarantee that the operation would move 
ahead. 
Germain had always planned for the SEF to be an indepen-
dent service so that it would not be subject to external pressures 
with respect to any findings in the studies it would issue. The 
chairman-founder of the CL understood that it was important 
to keep apart the functions of analyzing and decision making. 
The SEF therefore worked on its own or provided analysis at the 
specific request of other departments in the bank but was never 
the decision maker. Evidence of how watertight this division was 
between the SEF’s analysis and decision making by the other 
departments can be found in the archives. Although it is pos-
sible to establish the purposes of SEF studies either by studying 
them directly or by reading other research [Flandreau, 2003], 
it proved impossible to discover the extent to which the SEF’s 
findings influenced decision making by the other departments 
or services receiving these studies. However, two factors suggest 
that they did play a major role. First, Germain laid great empha-
sis on this service. Second, the periods of the bank’s success and 
its subsequent decline also corresponded to the periods when 
the SEF was at first considered irreplaceable but subsequently 
progressively neglected.
Technical Studies: With respect to its banking intermediation 
activities, for which the SEF was mobilized, the CL mainly dealt 
with mining and industrial companies that needed to raise con-
siderable funds to finance their investments. Railway companies 
had no need for financial intermediation since they received 
a state guarantee in 1840 underwriting the issuance of their 
shares. This guarantee ensured the public’s trust and therefore 
9
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they were able to sell their bonds directly to their clientele at 
ticket offices in train stations.
The purpose of the so-called technical studies was to de-
scribe the conditions affecting the supply-chain and business 
activities of the different entities in a given group. The goal was 
to place a company in its competitive environment by high-
lighting historical details relating to the different stages of its 
development by providing data on the geographical locations 
of its factories and their accessibility, by assessing the quality of 
different supply sources, and by analyzing the successive invest-
ments undertaken. 
The purpose of the section dealing with production was to 
shed light on the production process as a whole, from the min-
ing of raw materials to the marketing of finished products. The 
SEF did not lack the elements of comparison as it produced 
data and statistics on both the company under scrutiny and its 
competitors. The SEF was in a position to refer to sector-specific 
information gathered from the annual public reports published 
by the Ingénieurs des Mines and to compare them with data 
disclosed, it appears, in a company’s accounting of its internal 
costs. On this point, however, we should be cautious because the 
precision of certain calculations may lead us to assume that the 
only possible source was the company itself. Yet, at other times, 
precise data are missing either because the CL had not received 
them or the company was unable to provide them. As we will 
see later, the bank analyzed the accounting for net income using 
gross operating profit without knowing how it had been reached. 
These data therefore essentially appear to stem from excellent 
knowledge of the sector and timely investigations within the 
company itself as a number of reports about on-site visits testify. 
These data allow us to suggest that cost accounting and financial 
accounting were totally decoupled. In the event that precise data 
were lacking, the auditor would extrapolate from past indica-
tors.
Financial Studies: The financial studies contained a descriptive 
part drawing together the various elements that formed their 
basis, the considerable work of restating accounting data that 
department staff conducted upstream. These financial reports 
detailed how the main accounting items were established (ac-
quisitions, sell-offs, content), described the accounting methods 
used (measuring inventories, amortization policy), and assessed 
the pertinence of dividend payouts by comparing them with the 
profits generated. The reports concluded with a valuation of 
10
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the share price that was calculated, depending on the case, by a 
measurement (specific to the SEF) of the company’s assets, by 
capitalizing dividends, or by simulating forced bankruptcy.
Yet, the most notable feature during this turn-of-the-century 
period of transition resided in the considerable work of restating 
and analyzing accounting data disclosed on a company’s balance 
sheet, income statement, and corresponding reports. By first de-
constructing and then reconstructing the financial statements 
provided by companies, the analysts at the CL sought to forge 
their own opinion on the “veracity” (the term used at that time) 
of the net income disclosed by comparing the company’s figures 
with net incomes reached using their own methods. 
The dual aim of the SEF was to break away from the uncer-
tainties associated with the disclosed accounts and to implement 
a homogeneous method of restating accounting data that offered 
several advantages – standardizing processes for producing re-
stated data, generating economies of scale, ensuring soundness 
in decision making, minimizing risk, and creating internal tech-
nical competencies. 
Issues Relating to Disclosed Accounts: The lack of homogeneity 
in corporate accounting practices constituted the major chal-
lenge facing the SEF. This situation arose due to the following 
phenomenon. In the absence of any accounting standards, the 
lack of standardization of key concepts, such as those relating 
to calculated cash flow8 or to the recognition of rules defining 
assets as opposed to expenses, raised difficulties in interpret-
ing the same economic situation. In order to enable translation 
into accounting terms, this situation led to the use of numerous 
accounts that worked differently. In other words, assets might 
be charged indiscriminately either to the balance sheet or the 
income statement, and depreciations might or might not be 
recorded according to the ultimate configuration that company 
boards sought to give to their financial statements. 
More specifically for the CL, it was statements of invest-
ments (whether assets or expenses) that posed the greatest 
difficulty for interpretation. The SEF had little information at 
its disposal that enabled it to know the criteria that a company 
8 This is stretching the current classical distinction between calculated ex-
penses and paid expenses to cover all accounting movements that do not result in 
a monetary flow, owing to the facts that amortizations, provisions, and reserves 
fulfil analogous functions and that the accounting distinctions conceptually es-
tablished today did not exist at that time.
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was following in improving, transforming, or acquiring an in-
vestment and whether such an investment was an asset or an 
expense. Echoing this issue was the question of how expendi-
ture on fixed assets was amortized. The methods most often 
encountered were industrial amortization expenses, depletion of 
a reserve account created for this purpose, and assets charged to 
other reserve accounts or to accounts made of matured bonds. 
The corollary of this was the deduction of depreciation from the 
fixed-asset account in question. 
Nevertheless, by examining reports disclosed with annual 
statements, CL analysts were able to identify the different types 
of accounting used by companies to state the fall in value of 
their investments. Above and beyond the existence of statutory 
amortization (most commonly either a rate of one fifth or a fixed 
amount, both recorded as a drop in the gross operating profit), 
companies turned to other ways of accounting for amortizations 
that evaded disclosure in the profit-and-loss account. Thus, the 
Compagnie des Forges et Aciéries de la Marine et d’Homécourt 
did not hesitate to multiply and blend the different options that 
were open to it. From 1856 to 1860, it set up a reserve amortiza-
tion fund that was both charged and depleted at the same time 
over its financial years. Subsequently, this account remained 
relatively inactive until the 1880s when once again it began to 
be depleted. In 1867, it added an insurance fund that, according 
to CL annotations, did not undergo any transactions other than 
in 1869 and in 1872. Furthermore, being able to charge bond 
reimbursements to the profit-and-loss account created de facto 
supplementary reserves that could be used for future amortiza-
tions. This was the case from 1869 to 1887 and then from 1908 
to 1919. Reserves could also be merged. 
Faced with the impossible task of formulating an exact idea 
of what fixed-asset and stockholder-equity accounts contained, 
the SEF developed a statement that, although unable to provide 
precise information on asset purchases and sales (charged to 
fixed-asset accounts at sale price), enabled the SEF to know 
the variations in fixed assets between one financial year and 
another.
 
THE SEF METHOD: THE WORK OF RESTATING ACCOUNTS
Until the inter-war period, the diversity of accounting prac-
tices made it difficult for a third party to utilize accounts dis-
closed by companies. The SEF therefore set out very early on to 
conduct technical and financial studies which, thanks to an ac-
counting and financial method, allowed it to formalize a certain 
12
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number of restatements so as to measure better the net incomes 
of companies with which the CL wished to maintain or develop 
a business relationship.
To compensate for the lack of reliability in disclosed ac-
counts, the CL set up a coherent system of financial analysis 
based on two financial concepts, excess working capital and 
gross operating profit, which hinged on the key concept of “new 
works” (travaux neufs). However, the relevance of this model 
depended on prior work on restating disclosed accounts using 
formalized statements with a number of articulations.
A Key Concept: Calculating “New Works”: The CL performed most 
of its financial brokerage business with industrial companies 
that were required to reinvest relentlessly in order to remain 
competitive. These investments, named “new works” by the SEF, 
weighed heavily on the profitability of these companies which, 
to improve the financial picture portrayed in their operating 
statement, cut amortization expenses by transferring them, in 
all or in part, onto their balance-sheets accounts. The goal of 
the analysts at the CL was therefore to acquire a reliable and 
homogeneous performance indicator. The intent was to break 
away from window-dressing that might alter the impact of “new 
works” on net income.9 Building such an indicator presupposed 
having already identified and isolated all the accounting items 
that contribute to making up these “new works.” 
“New works” were therefore calculated on the basis of the 
variation in net fixed assets to which were added all the decreas-
es that the company had experienced during the financial year. 
These were added in the form of asset sales or amortizations 
charged to the different items of equity (profits, reserves, capital, 
amortized bonds). The calculated figure reached constituted the 
“new works in the financial year” (travaux neufs de l’exercice).
The “new works in the financial year” could then either be 
charged in total to gross operating profit in order to attain, fol-
lowing other restatements, the profits and losses for the period 
9 The SEF auditors did not fail to inform Germain of the impact of new works 
on the accounting income. In a letter dated March 4, 1902 addressed to the chair-
man of the CL, Lucien Rolland d’Estape clearly states, with respect to the Com-
pagnie des Hauts-Fourneaux, Forges et Aciéries de la Marine et des Chemins de Fer: 
“I have compared turnover with gross profit, from which overheads have been 
deducted, but not with the net operating profit, so that the percentage would be 
free from the accidental variations that arise from the difference, often signifi-
cant from one year to the next, in the amount of new works” [CL Archive, deef 
23828].
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according to the SEF method. They could also be used to com-
pare the profits disclosed by the company and the profits calcu-
lated using the SEF method.
In other words, analysts at the CL rejected all capitalization 
of “new works” and treated them as definitive expenses. In this 
way, they broke away from the accounting dualism (charging to 
the profit-and-loss account and/or to the balance sheet) that was 
being exploited by companies. Consequently, they could develop 
their own accounting for net income (indifferently called profits 
and losses or total net profits), calculated on the basis of varia-
tions in overall cash flows (called excess working capital) which 
was subsequently compared with the gross operating profit.
Yet, “new works” were not just intermediary amounts; they 
too were subjected to analysis in the reports. They were gener-
ally used to assess the level of investment carried out during a fi-
nancial year, and their impact was accounted for in the analysis 
of the amount of profits disclosed. 
Financial Concepts – Variation in Excess Working Capital and 
Gross Operating Profit: Analysts at the CL were interested in 
knowing their clients’ performance and thereby assessing the 
profitability of their companies. However, to achieve this end, 
they had to possess reliable measurement indicators and, better 
still, by deploying alternative calculation processes, to be able 
to cross-check their figures by reaching identical net-income 
results. For these reasons, as already stated, the SEF set out to 
measure net income using two different concepts – variation in 
excess working capital and gross operating profit. 
Variation in excess working capital requires a brief detour 
to look at the underlying notion, namely “working capital,” a 
term coined during the 19th century but employed in different 
[Batsch, 1995, p. 15] or even contradictory [Lemarchand, 1993, 
pp. 366, 569] ways. Within the CL, this expression (still com-
monly found in the form of “revolving fund” in the 1870s) ex-
clusively denoted current assets that, in addition to inventories, 
accounts receivable, and cash accounts, also generally included 
the portfolio of shares and bonds. 
An essential sign of the asset liquidity in which the CL was 
particularly interested, the analysis of working capital constitut-
ed a significant part of the comments found in the reports. After 
each constituent item was broken down in detail and justified as 
to its makeup and measurement, the report concluded with an 
assessment of its reliability and liquidity. The underlying idea 
was to ensure that once fixed assets were covered by sufficient 
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reserves, the working capital exceeded current liabilities, itself 
composed of the “floating” debt (i.e., revolving debt) and, less 
commonly, the “consolidated” debt (i.e., bonds payable). Shorn 
of inventories, and sometimes of shares and bonds, the excess 
working capital then became “immediate available assets” 
(short-term liquidity), as shown in Figure 3.
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FIGURE 3
A System of Accounting Restatements
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 The aim of the diagram is to show that the SEF calculated 
the performance of a company based on its capacity to generate 
cash flows. The particularity of the system is that potential net 
cash flows are calculated on the basis of the fictive liquidation 
of immediately available assets and liabilities. In a historical 
context where liquidity was rare and the banking system un-
derdeveloped, the CL, which was mainly a short-term lender, 
sought to ensure that its clients could face their short-term com-
mitments, even in the most difficult situations (i.e., bankruptcy). 
Furthermore, fixed assets were considered as being difficult for 
the CL to mobilize. For this reason, it accorded them little im-
portance and sought to “neutralize” them by ensuring only that 
they were covered with sufficient reserves. To mark clearly this 
conceptual difference between the long and the short terms, the 
diagram distinguishes between these two elements, whereas the 
CL only focused on the short term. Calculation of this liquidity, 
performed in successive stages, was accompanied by an assess-
ment of the overall situation which, to foster comparison, was 
reported in tonnage produced or per business operation.
Measured by its variation and after restatement of opera-
tions having no impact on the operating statement (sales of fixed 
assets, increases in capital, and dividend payouts), the excess 
working capital constitutes an interesting indicator of a compa-
ny’s cash flow in that, with its very mode of calculation free from 
potential window-dressing carried out on the profit-and-loss 
account, represents sound liquidity flows capable of confirming 
the reliability of disclosed profits. 
Net income calculated on the basis of the variation in excess 
working capital is also measured using the gross operating profit 
disclosed in the company’s accounts. However, since the CL did 
not dispose of any information regarding how it was made up 
(disclosed profit-and-loss accounts shifted seamlessly from turn-
over to gross profit), calculations on the basis of gross operating 
profit had only one purpose. That was to ensure the coherence 
of the whole financial-analysis system by obtaining a net-income 
figure identical to the one determined using the variation in ex-
cess working capital. The discretionary character of profit-and-
loss account disclosure at that time, the limited confidence the 
CL had in its reliability, and the clear preference for the balance 
sheet owing to its capacity to measure the company’s solvency 
meant that the former received much less comment in the re-
ports.
Analysis Statements – Possible Articulations and Cross-Checking: 
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It would appear that this coherent and complete system of fi-
nancial and accounting analysis emerged with the creation of 
the SEF in 1871. The first studies based on summary statements 
date from the early years of that decade. Although the archives 
consulted do not always provide a totally identical number 
of statements for each company (either because some were 
deemed unnecessary or because others have been lost or were 
left unfinished for lack of information), their composition varied 
little from one company to the next. This may be seen as a sign 
that there was a real desire to standardize analysis beyond the 
particular choices made by each company. 
The following statements served as a basis for the SEF’s 
work:
•	 Presenting	 the	 balance	 sheet,	 operating	 statement,	 and	
profit-and-loss account, as they were disclosed by a com-
pany, but adapted to an internal CL matrix which, nota-
bly, allowed working capital to be measured and excess 
working capital easily calculated.
•	 Drafting	 intermediary	 statements	 (investment	 expendi-
ture, calculation of net profit using excess working capi-
tal, and a linking statement) ensuring the link between 
the company’s accounts and those assessed by the CL 
on the one hand and, on the other, profits calculated on 
excess working capital and operating profits.
•	 Drafting	 the	 revised	balance	 sheet,	 operating	 statement,	
and profit-and-loss account calculated by the SEF in the 
previous two steps. 
This three-stage, account-restatement procedure was based 
on significant levels of theoretical thinking. In addition to cross-
checking consistency, the fundamental relationships that the CL 
established between net profit and excess working capital should 
be highlighted. A breakdown of these two concepts, with respect 
to modern techniques of financial analysis based on the funds 
statement and developed by the French Plan Comptable Général 
in 1982, illustrates the relevance of this approach (Appendix I).
In other words, the SEF succeeded in reaching a profit 
figure based solely on cash flows while ensuring that this result 
could be compared with the figure disclosed by the company us-
ing its linking statement. This method enabled the CL to make a 
clean break from the variety of ways used to account for invest-
ments whose impact on the disclosed profit it could not control. 
However, it should be noted that although analysts at the CL 
effectively succeeded in building a coherent system for examin-
ing accounts, they were still limited in their ability to  comment 
17
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on variations arising from one financial year to another without 
ever putting them into the perspective of a conceptual frame-
work as has been done in this analysis. The concordance they 
established was aimed more at ensuring the coherence of the 
system and the reliability of the net profit figure than at con-
stituting a tool for analyzing variations in corporate financing. 
Furthermore, this net-profit figure, free from the uncertainties 
tied to the variety of methods used to account for investments, 
was not developed any further in the commentaries.
In fact, their goal was two-fold. From an organizational 
viewpoint, it was a question of seeking to break away from the 
plethora of accounting practices in order to formalize common 
methods at the CL. From a technical viewpoint, it was a ques-
tion of isolating the flows of operating liquidity10 (variation in 
excess working capital) from the major impact of internally fi-
nanced investments so that the reliability of the net-profit figure 
calculated on the basis of balance-sheet items could be verified. 
This paper has sought to push this reasoning to its logical 
conclusion in order to test the relevance of the model and to 
show that in the final analysis, such theoretical thinking proves 
to be very close to current tools of analysis such as the funds 
statement or cash-flow statement.
MEASURING NET INCOMES: THE IMPACT OF 
RESTATEMENTS
The next step is to measure the impact of restatements car-
ried out by the SEF on disclosed net incomes. The interest of 
measuring this impact is to ensure that the main cause of vari-
ance between earnings disclosed by companies in a business re-
lationship with the CL and the results calculated by the SEF are 
due to the different ways of stating investments (“new works”). 
To do this, four types of calculation have been carried out:
(i) a comparison between the annual levels of profit de-
termined by the SEF and the annual levels of profit 
disclosed by companies. The aim is to show the impact 
of the accounting statement relating to “new works” on 
the level of earnings. 
(ii) the same comparison using a moving average over nine 
10 The term “operating” should be understood in its broadest sense; that is, 
free from the impact of investment expenditure and not compared with other 
forms of income (e.g., financial or extraordinary) which would make no sense at a 
time when modern distinctions were completely unformalized.
18
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years.11 The aim is to determine whether the variances 
smooth out over time and do indeed stem from the ac-
counting statement relating to “new works.”
(iii) a comparison (SEF vs. company) between the variance 
in amortizations and the variance in profits in order to 
ensure that it is indeed the accounting statement in-
cluding the “new works” that has an impact on the net 
income disclosed by companies
(iv) the same comparison using a moving average over nine 
years
The present analysis was carried out using case studies 
based on the annual accounts of two companies, one of which, 
the Société de Vezin-Aulnoye, had a precarious financial balance 
that tended to worsen at the turn of the 20th century. The other, 
the Compagnie des Hauts-Fourneaux, des Forges et Aciéries de la 
Marine et d’Homécourt, maintained sustained growth up to the 
eve of World War I. However, due to a lack of data over time, 
only the first calculation could be carried out in the case of the 
Société de Vezin-Aulnoye.
With regard to the comparison of annual profits, we can 
observe that short and stable periods present fewer variances 
between disclosed profits and those calculated by the CL as 
testified by the regularity of the figures reached during the 
years 1884-1890. In contrast, over a short and turbulent period 
(financial difficulties facing the Société de Vezin-Aulnoye or con-
junctural growth12 for the Compagnie d’Homécourt over the pre-
vious decade), the CL method tended to increase the variances 
between the figures calculated by the SEF and those disclosed 
by the company (Figures 4 and 5).
The differences observed were significant. The variance 
between profit figures calculated by the CL and disclosed profit 
amounted to 67% for the Société de Vezin-Aulnoye from 1889-
1890 to 1901-1902, and 306% for the Compagnie d’Homécourt 
over the years 1907-1919. Whereas companies, such as Vezin-
Aulnoye, could limit industrial amortizations (i.e., those that the 
11 In order to avoid superimposing the graphs and to facilitate their reading, 
the moving average is calculated on the basis of half of the average lifespan of 
investments carried out by the companies. 
12 “Repercussions from the international crisis were only felt at the end of 
1907 and the industrial recession was only slight....Europe remained unaffected 
by the American slowdown of 1910-1911.... Industrial production would exceed, 
in 1913, the 1908 level by 32%; the increase rose to 58% for the steel industry, 65% 
for the mechanics industry while production of potash doubled” [Flamant, 1976, 
pp. 329-331].
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company recorded in its profit-and-loss accounts) to reduce the 
impact on their bottom line of a conjuncture or unsuccessful 
management, CL’s restatement of “new works” had the effect 
of erasing the smoothing effect caused by amortizations of the 
disclosed accounts and of increasing the variances between the 
two forms of net incomes. Conversely, periods of strong growth, 
such as that experienced by the Compagnie d’Homécourt be-
tween 1916 and 1919, were used by the companies to increase 
their amortization expenses and therefore to reduce their net 
incomes, with the effect of stimulating the net profit calculated 
by the SEF. In other words, during stable cycles, disclosed net 
incomes and the CL’s net incomes were similar, whereas in tur-
bulent periods they seemed to diverge significantly. 
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In this sense, the SEF-implemented statements constituted 
effective alarm indicators for risk because they enabled the SEF 
to state the real level of a company’s activity based on its cash 
flow rather than on its disclosed earnings, the object of much 
manipulation. The CL could then adjust its commitments (short-
term operations and financial intermediation) with a better un-
derstanding of its clients’ financial situations. 
Over the longer term, the SEF restatements had a minor 
impact, and the figures calculated on both sides tended to bal-
ance out (Figure 6). The cumulated profits calculated by the CL 
differ from the figures disclosed by the Compagnie d’Homécourt 
by only 5%, whereas the extreme variances were 0.64% in 1878 
and 119% in 1918. Such a mild impact is logical because both 
the method of amortizing “new works” used in the disclosed 
accounts and the CL’s method of charging them globally had, 
in the end, an identical effect on profit levels. Moreover, this 
method offered little of interest to a managerial approach of 
forecasting risk and preferring liquidity. What mattered most 
to the CL was the predictability in the short and, in due course, 
medium term. 
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FIGURE 6
Comparison of C.L. Net Profits - Cie des Hauts-Fourneaux…
d’Homécourt Disclosed Net Profits (1856-1919) -
Rolling Average Over 9 Years
The last interesting element to analyze is the impact of re-
stating “new works” on the net income. To this end, it suffices 
to compare for each financial year the variance in amortiza-
tions with the variance in net profit. Indeed, if the two variances 
have a similar movement, it means that the main source of 
divergence between the two forms of net income arises from the 
restatement (amortizations or “new works”) of investments. The 
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first is calculated by measuring the difference between disclosed 
amortizations and amortizations calculated by the CL (potential 
amortizations and “new works”); the second by deducting from 
the disclosed profits those calculated by the CL.
In the stable short term, variances in amortizations are 
shown to be close to variances in profits, but the difference rises 
in periods of instability, regardless of whether they were profit-
able like in the period 1916-1919 for the Compagnie d’Homécourt 
(Figure 7). Over the longer term, as measured using rolling 
averages, the variances balance out (Figure 8). Differences in 
amortizations (6%) are not far at all from those in profits (5%). 
FIGURE 7
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This close correlation confirms that the issue of “new works” 
constituted the main source of concealment of profit or loss by 
companies. For the CL, it was therefore important to know the 
impact of these investments on its clients’ earnings since a low 
level of cash flow could be an indication of a lower performance 
and of an increased risk of failure. This type of information gave 
it a competitive advantage as it could better select its clients, re-
duce its risks, and improve its financial performance.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
This paper confirms the importance that companies have 
always given to cash flows to estimate the viability and reality 
of an economic activity [Lemarchand, 1992]. It also enables us 
to shed new light on the expectations of a creditor bank. Faced 
with a plethora of uncontrollable accounting practices, the bank 
pushed its rationale to its limit, considering any investment 
as an expense, by building a technical system that enabled the 
CL to verify the sincerity and the regularity of the accounts 
submitted for its inspection (cross-checking the net income by 
two methods). It also satisfied the preference for liquidity for 
which it had consistently argued. By implementing this type of 
accounting restatement, the SEF succeeded in achieving the first 
goal set by the founder of the CL – detecting as effectively as 
possible the risk of insolvency of any company seeking to build 
a business relationship with this top-tier bank. This study also 
shows that the issue of financing constitutes a central pillar of 
measuring and controlling the real performance of a company 
and demonstrates how close the CL method was to the modern 
concept of “free cash flow” (operating cash flow – capital expen-
ditures – dividends paid out).
Reliance on such account analysis fell after the war. We 
might assume that the development of medium and long-term 
bank financing and the fall in corporate internal financing from 
the inter-war period were the causes of this decline. However, 
this argument does not apply directly. In many countries, funds 
statements emerged very early on by whatever means companies 
financed their activities. 
In the U.S., the funds statement emerged as early as 1863, 
taking on numerous forms until 1925 when these converged 
in the concept of variation in working capital [Rosen and De-
Coster, 1969]. This form then developed towards the statement 
of changes in financial position [APB 19, 1971] and then the 
cash-flow statement [SFAS 95, 1984]. In France, the first funds 
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 statements appeared at the end of the 1950s taking multiple 
forms until the Plan Comptable Général of 1982 which high-
lighted the relation between net global working capital (working 
capital + amortizations and provisions + long-term liabilities 
– gross investments), working-capital requirements (inventories 
+ creditors – debtors), and cash and cash equivalents [Hoarau, 
1995]. On an international level, this change mirrored the one 
seen in the U.S. where the statement of changes in financial po-
sition of 1977 was replaced on January 1, 1994 by the cash-flow 
statement.
Furthermore, it is interesting to note a recurrence of the 
same issues among those who instigate such tools [Hoarau, 
1995]. In the first phase, they seek to highlight the risk of liquid-
ity. In the second phase, their goal is to account for the set of 
movements that affect the financial situation by focusing more 
specifically on the issue of structural financing. In the third 
phase, they return to the issue of measuring solvency, this time 
through a more in-depth analysis of cash flows split between 
operations, investments, and financing.
The tool implemented by the CL and described in this pa-
per arose from the first phase. However, it is interesting to note 
that its technical construction is close to tools implemented in 
France in the second phase. Furthermore, the CL may be seen 
as a long-forgotten forerunner in the French context, whereas 
this type of tool had already seen relatively widespread use in 
the U.S.
Yet, at the dawn of the 21st century, it is surprising to hear 
echoes of concepts confidentially developed within the CL more 
than a century before: “ ‘We have observed significant divergen-
ces between cash flow caused by operations and disclosed net 
incomes, which sounds the alarm for potential profit manipula-
tion,’ explains the company [Weiss Ratings] that has studied 
7,000 companies” [Fay, 2002, p. 3].
The European Commission [1997, p. 8] shares this position: 
This additional angle of observation [cash-flow state-
ments] is deemed very useful by most users and pre-
parers, because it is not influenced by accruals and 
matching and therefore does not involve conventions 
and estimates. It may also enhance the comparability 
of the reporting of operating performances by different 
enterprises, as it eliminates most of the effects of us-
ing different account treatments for the same transac-
tions and events.The joint use of cash flow statements, 
balance sheets and profit and loss accounts also helps 
24
Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 37 [2010], Iss. 1, Art. 2
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol37/iss1/2
25Praquin, The Crédit Lyonnais
users in better evaluating the changes in net assets of 
an enterprise and its financial structure (including its 
liquidity and solvency), as well as its ability to affect the 
amounts and timing of cash flows in order to adapt to 
changing circumstances and opportunities. Morevover, 
this may allow a better assessment of the quality of the 
profits reported. 
However, it should be noted that de-consolidation op-
erations today enable unfavorable movements of cash flow to be 
concealed. Yet, the first consolidated statements only appeared 
at the end of the 19th century in the U.S. In France, several 
scholars commented on consolidation during the inter-war pe-
riod, but the first practices only became manifest in the 1950s. 
In the absence of (de)consolidation, the method used by the SEF 
proved to be very effective for assessing cash-flow movements in 
the balance sheets it analyzed.
One final question remains – why did the CL method disap-
pear? The most probable motive for the SEF’s gradual move 
away from accounting and financial-restatement tables was the 
fact that the tax administration stipulated as a precondition for 
deducting amortizations from taxable income that amortiza-
tions be recorded as expenses. This might also explain why other 
countries have continued to use funds statements when they 
were not employed in France until the 1950s. From that point 
forward, the financial interest of paying lower taxes trumped 
the rationale of concealing “new works.” Blended accounting 
(charging to reserves, amortizing bonds, recording assets as ex-
penses, etc.) disappeared in favor of a normalization of account-
ing through fiscal criteria [Praquin, 2006]. 
Focused squarely on measuring the significant impact of 
“new works” on economic and financial performance, SEF 
analysts unfortunately did not recognize the theoretical scope of 
their analytical framework which exceeded the restrictive limits 
it had been assigned. Historical research therefore enables us to 
bring these anonymous precursors of financial analysis out of 
the shadows and to pay our respects to the contemporary rel-
evance of the concepts they developed.
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APPendiX i
Measuring Cash Flows: From the CL (1870s) to the  
French Plan Comptable Général, 1982
C.L.: ∆ ex. W.C. + [D.P.F.Y. – I.C. – S.F.A. + N.W.] = G.o.P. – [V.A. – V.I. + B.Y.] = T.n.P.
C.T.: ∆ WCr + ∆ nT – ∆ GNWC = CFoA – V.A.
(Excluding external 
financing and cash flows 
from operating activities)
Where:  C.L.: Crédit Lyonnais C.T.: current transposition 
 ∆ Ex. W.C.: Variation in excess working capital.
 D.P.F.Y.: Dividend paid out during the financial year I.C.: Increase in Capital
 S.F.A.: Sale of fixed assets  N.W.: New Works
 G.O.P.: Gross operating profit V.A.: Various amortizations
 V.I.: Various inflows B.Y.: Bond yields
 T.N.P.: Total net profit  WCR: Working Capital
   Requirement
 GNWC = Global Net Working Capital NT: Net Treasury
 CFOA = Cash flows from operating activities
Comments: 
1. Entries in bold type bring out the basic points highlighted by the concepts of the Crédit 
Lyonnais or by the French Plan Comptable Général 1982. 
2. Insofar as:
•	 The current financing statement includes variations in long-term external financing, 
which was virtually nonexistent during that era due to the preference for internal 
financing, except in several industrial sectors; the comparison above is totally pos-
sible. Also, the Crédit Lyonnais sometimes “relegated” this external financing to the 
excess working capital; so it was already balanced out. 
•	 Calculated expenditure and products are virtually nonexistent and cash flows from 
operating activities and total net profit tend to be confused. 
3. In France, there is a formula to analyse the financial balance of any company which is:
•	 (Inventories + Accounts receivable) – Accounts payable = Working Capital Require-
ment (WCR).
•	 Treasury in assets – Bank overdrafts = Net Treasury (NT).
•	 (Equity + Long Term Liabilities) – Fixed Assets = Global Net Working Capital 
(GNWC)
 Then: WCR + NT = GNWC.
4. Variations in WCR and in NT are equal to the variation in GNWC; by deducting this 
same variation from GNWC (excluding external financing), with deduction of cash flows 
from operating activities, cash flows logically match up to operating activities. The sole 
purpose of this tautology is to show that the Crédit Lyonnais was handling concepts that 
were very close to ‘ours’ but with very different outcomes – measurement of liquidity and 
of the inflowing income and not calculation of a financial balance based on the excess of 
stable resources (that is liabilities). 
Notes on calculations:
Detail of the calculation: the breakdown is carried out using the “calculation of net profits 
through the SEF method” [Excess Working Capital]”  and the “profit and loss account set 
up according to the SEF method”  from which the net accounting incomes are equal:
: ∆ Excess Working Capital (∆ Ex. W.C.) – Statutory royalties and gratuities + Dividend 
paid out in the financial year (D.P.F.Y.) – Increase in the capital (I.C.) – Sale of fixed assets 
(S.F.A.) + New works carried over as an increase in fixed assets (N.W.F.A.) = Total net profit 
(T.N.P.)
: (Gross) operating profit (G.O.P.) – New Works charged to Expenses (N.W.E.) – Various 
amortizations (V.A.) + Various inflows (V.I.) – Bond yields (B.Y.) – Statutory royalties and 
gratuities = Profits and losses = Total net profit (T.N.P.).
Which enables us to write:
ð ∆ Ex. W.C. + D.P.F.Y. – I.C. – S.F.A. + N.W.F.A. = G.O.P. – N.W.E. + [–V.A. + V.I. – B.Y.]
We may also write:
ð ∆ Ex. W.C. + D.P.F.Y. – I.C. – S.F.A. + N.W.F.A. + N.W.E. = G.O.P. + [–V.A. + V.I. – B.Y.]
ð ∆ Ex. W.C. + [D.P.F.Y. – I.C. – S.F.A. + N.W.]        = G.O.P. + [–V.A. + V.I. – B.Y.]
28
Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 37 [2010], Iss. 1, Art. 2
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol37/iss1/2
